Le, Hanh Thi My and Ting, Irene Wei Kiong and Kweh, Qian Long and Ngo, Ha Lam Tan (2023) CEO duality, board size and firm performance : Evidence in Vietnam. International Journal of Business Excellence, 29 (1). pp. 98-120. ISSN 1756-0047. (Published)
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Abstract
From the perspective of the agency and stewardship theories for explaining the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, this study examines the impacts of CEO duality and board size on the firm performance. We assess the association between CEO duality, board size and firm performance of top 200 companies listed on the Vietnam Stock Exchange (VSE) over 2014–2015. Our findings show that: 1) CEO duality limits the monitoring function of the board, and a large board size promotes dominance and power of leaders that create more conflicts; 2) the number of executive directors in the top management positively influences firm performance. Findings of our study certainly help policymakers and other stakeholders understand the relationship between CEO duality, board size and firm performance. Overall, this study highlights the CEO duality and the relationship of board size and firm performance in a nation with less protection of minority shareholders.
Item Type: | Article |
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Additional Information: | Indexed by Scopus |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Board size; CEO duality; Firm performance; Vietnam |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management T Technology > T Technology (General) |
Faculty/Division: | Faculty of Industrial Management |
Depositing User: | Mr Muhamad Firdaus Janih@Jaini |
Date Deposited: | 30 Apr 2024 06:23 |
Last Modified: | 30 Apr 2024 06:23 |
URI: | http://umpir.ump.edu.my/id/eprint/40469 |
Download Statistic: | View Download Statistics |
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